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Recent Decisions
FEDERAL COURTS-HABEAS

CORPUS-STATE PRISONER-WAIVER

OF

United States
Supreme Court has held that absent both a showing of cause for
failure to make a timely objection and a showing of actual prejudice,
a state prisoner's failure to comply with a state statute requiring
that objections to the introduction of illegally obtained confessions
must be raised at or prior to trial precludes federal habeas corpus
relief on a subsequent claim that the confession was coerced.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT-COERCED CONFESSION-The

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
John Sykes was convicted of murder in the third degree after a
jury trial in Florida in which two policemen testified concerning
incriminatory statements Sykes made after he had been arrested
and given his Mirandawarnings.' During the trial it was shown that
Sykes had been intoxicated at the time of his arrest; however,
Sykes' counsel raised no objection to the admissibility of the statements on grounds that his client failed to understand the Miranda
warnings and gave them involuntarily. 2 It also appeared that this
issue was not raised on direct appeal to the intermediate appellate
court of Florida, where the conviction was affirmed.3 Subsequently,
in a petition for a state writ of habeas corpus, Sykes challenged the
admissibility of his confession for failure to understand the Miranda
warnings. After that petition was denied by state court, the identical claim was presented to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida in a petition for federal habeas corpus
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 The district court found the
1. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 74 (1977). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
held that the constitutional prerequisites to the admissibility of confessions made while in
police custody consisted of warning the suspect prior to questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that any statement made may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has the right to the presence of either retained or appointed counsel.
2. 433 U.S. at 74-75.
3. There is some confusion on this point. In its denial of Sykes' petition for state habeas
corpus, the Florida Second District Court of Appeals intimated that the issue had been raised
on direct appeal. The federal district court, viewing the petition for a federal writ of habeas
corpus, found it had not been so raised and Sykes did not challenge that finding. See id. at
75 n.3.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which confers jurisdiction upon federal courts for habeas
corpus petitions by state prisoners, provides in part:
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record in the state courts too meager to render a determination on
the involuntariness claim. It therefore ordered a state evidentiary
hearing on that issue5 and stayed issuance of the writ pending such
hearing.' The state appealed the interlocutory order to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, where the district court was affirmed.'
The court of appeals held that an evidentiary hearing on voluntariness was required, and further, that Sykes' failure to comply with a
Florida "contemporaneous objection" rule' was not a bar to the
issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus. In its view, the state
procedural default would act as a bar only if there had been a
deliberate bypass of the objection at trial for tactical reasons. 9 Davis
v. United States,"' which barred federal habeas corpus to one who
had failed to comply with federal procedural rules absent a showing
of cause and proof that prejudice resulted, was distinguished. In
Davis, there had been no prejudice to the defendant; however, prejudice was inherent in failure to object to admission of an incriminating statement as in Sykes." After granting certiorari," the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded.' 3
Justice Rehnquist prefaced the majority opinion by noting that
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
5. The district court's order was made on the basis of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964), which held that a federal habeas court, faced with an incomplete or unreliable state
record regarding the voluntariness of a confession upon which the conviction was based,
should return the case to state court for a full evidentiary hearing on that issue before
determining the merits of the federal habeas corpus petition.
6. 433 U.S. at 75-76. The unpublished interlocutory order of the district court was also
discussed by the court of appeals. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
7. 528 F.2d at 528.
8. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(i) provides in relevant part:
(1) Grounds. Upon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, the court shall
suppress any confession or admission obtained illegally from the defendant.
(2) Time for Filing. The motion to suppress shall be made prior to trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the
motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion or an appropriate
objection at the trial.
9. This was the rule enunciated in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See text accompanying notes 39-44 infra.
10. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
11. 528 F.2d at 526-27.
12. 429 U.S. 883 (1976).
13. 433 U.S. at 73.
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in all major issues surrounding the use of federal habeas corpus as
a vehicle for collateral review of state judgments 4 there had been
an "historic willingness" by the Court to revise its prior views on the
proper scope of availability of the writ. 5 With this groundwork laid,
the majority addressed the issue of when a procedural default in
state court should be a bar to issuance of a federal habeas corpus
writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The standard of Fay v. Noia,'I which
denied access to federal habeas only upon a finding that the petitioner had "deliberately bypassed"' 7 the state rule and thus clearly
waived his right to present the federal issue to state court, was
rejected." In its stead, the Court extended the double-edged test
announced in Davis v. United States," and followed in Francis v.
Henderson'" (barring habeas review in cases where an otherwise
fatal procedural default had been committed unless there was
"cause" shown to excuse the misstep and the petitioner had been
"prejudiced" by the alleged constitutional violation'), to cases involving federal habeas petitioners who failed to abide by state procedural rules requiring objections to be made to allegedly involuntary confessions at the trial. This restriction of federal habeas
where state procedural rules, especially those requiring contemporaneous objections, had been violated by the petitioner was seen by
Justice Rehnquist as advancing four worthwhile goals: encouraging
federal respect for state procedural rules; 3 reinforcing the laudatory
effects that contemporaneous objection rules have on the adminis14. Id. at 78-79. The major areas of controversy identified by the Court were: types of
federal claims that a federal habeas court could consider, the extent to which the federal court
had to defer to prior state findings on the constitutional issue, the requirement that state
remedies be exhausted before seeking federal relief, and the extent to which adequate and
independent state grounds would bar federal habeas review of otherwise cognizable constitutional issues. It was this latter controversy that was directly at issue in Wainwright v. Sykes.
15. Id. at 81. The Court acknowledged that this willingness to alter its previous views was
not dependent upon any statutory change in federal habeas corpus laws.
16. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See notes 39-44 and accompanying text infra.
17. 372 U.S. at 438-39. Fay defined a deliberate bypass in terms of the classic definition
of waiver stated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937), as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
18. 433 U.S. at 87-88.
19. 411 U.S. 233 (1973). See notes 47-49 and accompanying text infra.
20. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). See notes 50-53 and accompanying text infra.
21. 425 U.S. at 542.
22. 433 U.S. at 87.
23. Id. at 88. Justice Rehnquist felt that Florida's contemporaneous objection rule, as the
enactment of a "coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system," was entitled to more
respect than Fay allowed.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 16: 403

tration of justice; 4 preventing "sandbagging" by defense attorneys
in state criminal actions; 5 and insuring the integrity and finality of
state proceedings."
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that Sykes was in no way a curtailment of a state prisoner's right to a de novo determination by a
federal court of the merits of his constitutional claim; rather, it was
an attempt to limit federal habeas review of constitutional issues
that had not been raised in state court.Y The majority opinion expressly declined to define the meaning and scope of either "cause"
or "prejudice. 218 Future cases were anticipated to undertake that
task.2 9 For the present, the Court would only say that the availability of federal habeas review of state convictions where the constitutional issues had not been raised due to procedural default was now
"narrower" than it had been under Fay's "deliberate bypass" standard.30 Confidence was expressed, however, that the new standard
would not unduly restrict federal courts from considering the constitutional claims of defendants who would otherwise be the victims
3
of miscarriages of justice in state courts. '
24. Id. at 88-89. Among the advantages pinpointed as flowing from a viable contemporaneous objection rule were: allowing decision on the merits while witnesses' memories were
fresh and by the judge who observed their demeanor; possibly gaining immediate exclusion
of the challenged evidence which could lead to acquittal; forcing the prosecutor to reconsider
his use of the evidence for fear of reversal on appeal; and providing guidance, through the
state court's rendering of an opinion on the question, to a subsequent federal court considering
the same issue.
25. Id. at 89. "Sandbagging" was defined as the practice of failing to raise the constitutional issue in state court and gambling on acquittal, with the intention of raising the issue
in a later federal habeas corpus proceeding if the gamble failed.
26. Id. at 90. Justice Rehnquist sought to maximize the integrity of state criminal proceedings. All of society's resources had been marshalled for trial, and enforcement of a contemporaneous objection rule would ensure that the trial would be final-not just the warmup for a later federal habeas petition.
27. Id. at 87. The rule that a federal habeas court was not bound by determinations of
constitutional issues made in state proceedings was established in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953).
28. 433 U.S. at 87.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 90-91. The Court did not explain how they arrived at this optimistic outlook.
Three justices concurred in the majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger stated that he felt
Fay's deliberate bypass standard was appropriate only when the crucial decision was in the
hands of the defendant himself, and hence, did not apply to trial situations where tactical
decision-making responsibility was necessarily in the hands of counsel. Justice Stevens concurred with the majority on the basis that Fay had not been interpreted by the lower federal
courts to require a deliberate bypass by the defendant himself, but had been extended to
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Dissenting, Justice Brennan" would have affirmed the judgment
below on the basis of Fay v. Noia. In his view, Sykes' failure to
object timely was the result of his lawyer's inadvertent error and not
the product of a deliberate, tactical decision in which Sykes joined;
therefore it failed to constitute a "deliberate bypass" of the state
forum that would bind Sykes under the standard of Fay.3" Justice
Brennan accepted none of the majority's arguments for seeking to
deny federal habeas corpus review in situations of less than a
"deliberate bypass" by the defendant himself. 4 In particular, Justice Brennan dismissed the majority's fear of "sandbagging" by
defense attorneys as unfounded since state and federal adjudication
of constitutional issues are not mutually exclusive-there could be
no reason except inadvertence for not seeking vindication in the
prior state proceedings." 5 Justice Brennan also identified two federal
interests that argued for liberal availability of the federal writ. First,
strict adherence to state procedural rules would frustrate congressional policy in favor of federal habeas review of state convictions
by effectively placing the determination of available federal jurisdiction in the states3 Second, Fay v. Noia rightly required the same
standards for procedural waivers of constitutional rights as governed
substantive waivers.3" In sum, the shift to the "cause and prejudice"
cover cases, like Sykes', where the evidence permitted the inference that counsel had made
a tactical decision not to object to the admission of the statements. Justice White concurred
in the result on the grounds that the alleged error in the state court was harmless within the
rule of Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), where it was held that the admission of
confessions of other defendants, that admittedly violated petitioner's constitutional rights,
was not grounds for reversal when other evidence against the petitioner was so overwhelming
that the Court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the denial of constitutional
rights was harmless error.
32. 433 U.S. at 99. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion was joined in by Justice Marshall.
33. Id. at 104-05.
34. Id. at 102.
35. Id. at 103.
36. Id. at 106-07. Strict adherence by the Court to state procedural rules so as to block
federal habeas review of alleged constitutional violations in state court would render fundamental rights subordinate to these procedural rules. The states could, therefore, through the
enactment of rules of procedure, determine whether a petitioner will have access to a federal
forum for his constitutional claims. Justice Brennan felt that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 represented a
distinct congressional policy choice, in light of several available alternatives, in favor of
liberal federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. Any judicial consideration of a policy
regarding the consequences that should flow from the default of a state procedural rule had
to take congressional intent into consideration and, therefore, uphold the broader "deliberate
bypass" standard of Fay as more in keeping with congressional purpose.
37. 433 U.S. at 108-09. Judging both procedural and substantive waivers of fifth amend-
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test would jeopardize the primacy of constitutional rights that had
always been central to the American governmental system."8 The
dissent also dismissed the state interests advocated by the majority.
Most state procedural defaults are inadvertent; thus there can be
no realistically effective deterrent against them. 9 In addition, finality of state proceedings does not always represent the ultimate goal
to be achieved.40 Finally, Justice Brennan attacked the failure of the
Court to define precisely the elements of the "cause and prejudice"
test, insisting that in the absence of any persuasive alternative, the
deliberate bypass standard of Fay should be retained.4
The significance of Wainwright v. Sykes becomes clear upon review of several recent federal habeas decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and their cumulative effect on the use of the federal
writ by state prisoners. Originally, federal habeas, as a vehicle for
collateral review of state judgments, was possible only in limited
instances."m The evolution of the writ as a safeguard against possible
invasions of constitutional rights in state courts was accomplished
through gradual progression,4" culminating in Fay v. Noia.44 There,
ment rights by the same standard was believed important since the result in both instances
was the same-the introduction of defendant's own testimony to his prejudice.
38. Id. at 110-11.
39. Id. at 113. Even assuming that barring federal review for state procedural defaults due
to inadvertent lawyer error would encourage more thorough trial preparation, the result is
that the defendant is barred from any forum-a harsh result not justified by any agency
relationship between attorney and client.
40. Id. at 115. Justice Brennan pointed to other areas where finality was undermined. For
example, federal courts are unwilling to grant interlocutory review although such a course
would foster finality of the lower court's ultimate decision. In addition, the holding in Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), that federal habeas courts are not bound by state determinations of constitutional issues, was antagonistic to the concept of finality.
41. 433 U.S. at 116-17.
42. State prisoners were given the right to seek federal habeas corpus by the Act of
February 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385, which permitted a federal writ to issue to any prisoner
held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Two judicially
created doctrines, however, limited this right: state criminal convictions were originally held
reviewable by federal habeas courts only if the state court lacked "jurisdiction," Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880), and federal habeas corpus could not be sought until state
remedies had been exhausted, Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
43. Siebold's lack of jurisdiction requirement was stretched to a fiction to justify the
granting of federal writs. See Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal
Habeas Corpus, 61 HARV. L. REV. 657, 660 n.33 (1948). The requirement was discarded in
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (federal habeas corpus available, regardless of
whether the state court lacked jurisdiction, whenever conviction is in disregard of defendant's
constitutional rights). The exhaustion of state remedies requirement retained its vitality, see
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), and was codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)-(c) (1970). Two
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federal habeas relief was granted to a defendant who had failed to
appeal his state conviction for fear that a retrial could result in the
death penalty. He petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus on
grounds that the confession supporting his conviction had been unlawfully coerced. The decision in Fay limited the concept of exhaustion of state remedies45 and, more importantly for the present discussion, dispersed previous uncertainty by holding that state procedural defaults that would bar direct federal review did not preclude
federal habeas corpus consideration." Federal relief could be denied
the procedurally-defaulting state prisoner who had "waived" his
right to federal review, but a valid waiver required that the petitioner had "deliberately bypassed" orderly state procedures.47 A deliberate bypass was defined as an understanding and knowing refusal to raise the federal claim in state court for strategic or tactical
reasons." Noia's conduct, in the face of what was described as a
"grisly choice" between a life sentence and an appeal that might
have resulted in the death penalty, did not reach the level of a
deliberate bypass." The Fay standard, weighed as it was in favor of
the petitioning prisoner, provoked a marked increase in the number
of federal habeas petitions filed50 and a storm of criticism in law
reviews. 5
The continued vitality of Fay was first rendered suspect in a case
involving a federal prisoner's right of access to the federal writ.
Davis v. United States52 consisted of a constitutional challenge to
subsequent decisions made clear, however, the power of the federal habeas court to make an
independent determination on the merits after the petitioner had exhausted state processes.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
44. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
45. Id. at 435. It was held that the petitioner was required to exhaust only those state
remedies open to him at the time of application for the federal writ.
46. Id. at 399. Prior to the Fay decision, it was thought that a state procedural default
would be adequate state grounds to bar federal habeas review, although such a holding had
never been expressly stated by a majority of the Court. For a discussion of this point, see C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 53, at 243-44 (3d ed. 1976).
47. 372 U.S. at 438.
48. Id. at 439. The Court borrowed this definition directly from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. at 464.
49. 372 U.S. at 440.
50. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter].
51. See, e.g., Doub, The Case Against Modern FederalHabeas Corpus, 57 A.B.A.J. 323
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Doub]; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Friendly].
52. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
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the racial composition of an indicting grand jury-a challenge not
raised at any time prior to the petition for federal habeas. Denial of
federal collateral relief was upheld by the Supreme Court primarily
through reliance on the language of rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule requires that any objection
to an indictment be raised before trial, with failure to object being
construed as a waiver unless cause is shown."3 Thus, the Court
found the deliberate bypass standard of Fay inapplicable to federal
prisoners, holding that the federal writ could not issue unless cause
was shown to excuse the failure to make a timely objection or, alternatively, unless there was a finding of prejudice to the petitioner in
the court below that justified the granting of the writ.54
The Davis "cause and prejudice" standard was extended in
5 to a state prisoner who failed to object timely
Francisv. Henderson"
to the composition of a grand jury. Absent showings of both "cause"
for the noncompliance with state rules and "prejudice" to the petitioner in state court, the procedural default was held fatal. 6 The
Court found the rule of Davis applicable to the Francis situation,
despite legitimate distinguishing features.57 Comity and federalism
were said to be advanced by requiring that similar procedural defaults by federal and state prisoners be given the same import,
particularly since both systems were found to have identical interests in protecting the integrity and finality of the trial process. 8 The
Fay standard of deliberate bypass, developed to determine federal
habeas availability for state prisoners, was emasculated by the
Francis Court. Without expressly considering the applicability of
Fay, Francis relied on the standards developed for federal prisoners
in Davis, though Francis' status as a state prisoner made his situation much more analagous to that of the petitioner in Fay.
In addition to several other cases that appear in keeping with the
53. Id. at 242.
54. Id. at 244.
55. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
56. Id. at 542. It appears that while the "cause" and "prejudice" requirements were
viewed in Davis as alternative methods of justifying a granting of federal habeas review
despite a procedural mistake in state court, the Francis Court, without explanation, viewed
them as a dual requirement.
57. Davis involved a petition by a federal prisoner who had not shown any inadequacy
on the part of his counsel to establish cause for the waiver, while in Francis, the Court was
considering the petition of a state prisoner who had demonstrated the inadequacy of his
counsel. 425 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 541-42.
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general trend towards more restricted availability of federal collateral relief,"0 the Supreme Court has most recently held that federal
habeas is totally unavailable to state prisoners who seek to challenge
their convictions under the exclusionary rule."0
. Wainwright v. Sykes could be read narrowly to apply only to the
specific factual situation involved: waiver of the admission of a
confession through noncompliance with a state contemporaneous
objection rule." The current narrowing trend in the availability of
federal habeas, 2 however, makes it likely that the case has a broader
import. The probable effect is the establishment of the "cause and
prejudice" standard as the appropriate measure of the availability
of federal habeas relief whenever a state prisoner has failed to comply with any state procedural rule. As such, the impact of Sykes is
much greater than the arguably limited holding of Francis v.
Henderson 3 and amounts to a sub silentio overruling of Fay.4
59. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (failure to object at trial to having
to appear in prison garb held to constitute a waiver of such objection). See also Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (state prisoner challenging fact or duration of his imprisonment has as his sole remedy the federal writ of habeas corpus-no suit may be brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)). In view of the now more limited availability of federal habeas,
Preiserwill drastically reduce the ability of state prisoners to obtain federal collateral review
of their convictions.
60. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Supreme Court held that state prisoners
were precluded from seeking federal habeas to assert a claim that evidence produced by an
unlawful search and seizure had been admitted at trial absent a showing that the state had
failed to provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim. The exclusionary rule was
seen as designed primarily to deter future unlawful police conduct and not as a personal
constitutional right for redress of the victim of an illegal search. The Court concluded that
the societal costs of permitting federal habeas for fourth amendment claims far outweighed
any deterrent effect that often long-delayed petitions would have on police conduct.
61. 433 U.S. at 86-87. The court's language dealt specifically with the situation of a
waived objection to the admission of a confession at trial in state court. It declined to paint
with the same broad brush that it found was used in Fay. Id. at 88 n.12.
62. See notes 42-57 and accompanying text supra.
63. 425 U.S. at 541-42. The result in Francis could arguably be justified exclusively on
comity grounds. It presented the same factual situation as in Davis only it involved a state
prisoner. The Court could have felt obligated to adopt similar standards for challenges to the
racial compositions of both federal and state grand juries so as to prevent incongruous results
based solely on the petitioner's status.
64. 433 U.S. at 87-88. The Court purported to overrule only the "dicta" in Fay-i.e., the
application of the deliberate bypass standard to fact situations other than the one specifically
presented in Fay. There remains, however, the fact that the lower federal courts have followed
the rule of Fay in a variety of differing factual situations and such applications have now been
held improper. In Sykes, the Court also intimated that it might apply the "cause and prejudice" standard to a contemporary case presenting a factual situation identical to Fay. Id. at
88 n.12.
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The majority opinion is subject to serious criticism on two fronts.
First, the Court's justification for its retreat from Fay's high level
of federal habeas intervention in state proceedings is not persuasive;
second, the Court has not sufficiently articulated the new standard
to provide cogent guidelines for decision-making by the lower federal courts.
The basis for the Court's decision in Sykes was a desire to promote
the ideal of "finality" in the criminal process-an interest found
incompatible with the extensive availability of federal habeas relief
permitted by Fay.6 5 However, the Court made no attempt to balance
this societal interest with that of the individual litigant. The majority implied its preference for the collective versus the individual
interest by this silence." The Court also expressed a desire to advance "federalism" and lessen the federal-state friction emanating
from collateral federal review of state criminal proceedings. 7 The
fact seemingly overlooked by the majority, however, is that a federal
system breeds conflict by its very nature, 8 and any reduction in
availability of an important tool for the redress of constitutional
violations should be based only upon a reasoned conclusion that the
benefit to the system, through a lessening of tensions, will be significant enough to justify the change."
Another basis for the result in Sykes may be the practical pressures on the Court and its belief that a retreat from Fay would help
reduce the crushing workload of the federal courts.70 While it is clear
65. Id. at 88. The leading argument for finality in the criminal process can be found in
Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HARV. L.
REv. 441 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bator]. For a critical response to Bator's thesis, see
Carroll, Habeas Corpus Reform: Can Habeas Survive the Flood?, 6 CuM. L. REV. 363, 376-80
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Carroll].
66. Justice Brennan reminded the majority of the paramount importance of the constitutional rights of individuals in American life. 433 U.S. at 110-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 88. For arguments that federal-state tensions are unreasonably and unnecessarily increased by broad federal habeas review of state convictions, see Doub, supra note 51, at
326-27, and Bator, supra note 65, at 504. For an opposing view, see Chisum, In Defense of
Modern Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 21 DEPAUL L. REv. 682, 693-95 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Chisumi. In light of the fact that so few petitions are found to be
meritorious (Justice Clark, in his concurring opinion in Fay, placed the percentage at only
1.4%, 372 U.S. at 445 n.1), it is hard to justify the argument that tensions are being dramatically raised by federal habeas consideration.
68. See Frankfurter, supra note 50, at 500.
69. For a view that curtailment of the availability of federal habeas for state prisoners
would only minimally reduce the tensions between state and federal courts and thus, not be
worth the price, see Carroll, supra note 65, at 381.
70. Chief Justice Burger has expressed the opinion that the growth in the number of
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that Fay resulted in an increase in the number of federal habeas
corpus petitions filed,7 ' it is not certain that this has caused an
undue amount of judicial exertion, since the vast majority of such
petitions are disposed of summarily."
The failure to define either of the elements of the "cause and
prejudice" standard is the major shortcoming of the majority opinion.73 In the years since Fay's deliberate bypass standard was enunciated, it has been applied consistently and with little apparent
difficulty.74 The adoption of a new and imprecisely defined test will
surely lead to uncertainty and variation in the lower federal courts,
possibly resulting in an actual increase in federal habeas corpus
litigation as the boundaries of the "cause and prejudice" test are
sought.
Examining the probable meanings given both "cause" and
"prejudice," it appears that the new standard will be exceedingly
difficult to meet. The "cause" element was taken originally from the
language of rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.7" The varying interpretations given the term make a precise
definition impossible.7" Failure of the Court to provide any indication of what will be held "cause" makes it difficult for prisoners to
evaluate the potential merit of their claims and seems to ensure
federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners has significantly contributed to the overburdening of the federal courts. See Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J.
929 (1970).
71. In 1960, there were 871 federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners. In 1970,
the figure had risen to 9,063. In 1973, 7,784 such petitons were filed. For a summary of the
year by year increase, see Carroll, supra note 65, at 373 n.54.
72. See LaFrance, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: Who's Responsible?, 58
A.B.A.J. 610, 612 (1972); Chisum, supra note 67, at 698-99; Note, Federal Habeas Corpus
Review: Alive or A Wake?, 3 J. CONTENP. L. 321, 345-46 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Alive or
A Wakel.
73. 433 U.S. at 87.
74. Id. at 102 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 1973) (failure by
defendant to make motion to suppress evidence of an out-of-court photographic identification
held unexcused by any "cause" since defendant failed to show he lacked opportunity to move
in timely fashion); Morris v. Sullivan, 497 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1974) (state prisoners seeking
federal habeas corpus relief, who did not allege that their attorneys were incompetent or that
alleged jury discrimination was covert and undiscoverable, did not show "cause" to justify
their failure to raise the objections prior to trial as required by state law), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 905 (1976). In the Davis case, the Court stated that a petitioner's failure to use due
diligence to uncover notorious and available facts will result in a finding that "cause" has
not been shown for the failure to make a timely objection. 411 U.S. at 243.
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inconsistent determinations among different federal courts. The element of "prejudice" appears to require actual prejudice to have
occurred in the state court as a result of the constitutional violation.77 While the precise meaning of actual prejudice is unclear, it
appears that it constitutes more than a mere presumption of prejudice-rather, it is proof of prejudice in fact." Such a standard seemingly requires a petitioner to prove that he would not have been
convicted absent a violation of his rights in state court." While
certain applicants for federal habeas could probably show cause for
their failure to comply with procedural rules, the requirement of
proving actual prejudice erects an extremely high barrier to the
granting of relief.8 0 The Court has, through adoption of the "cause
and prejudice" test, effectively reversed the basic tenet of Fay that
violation of state procedural rules should not, absent exceptional
circumstances, preclude the availability of federal habeas corpus.
An unanswered question arising from the majority opinion is the
extent to which an attorney's negligence that results in a procedural
default will be binding on his client. Fay focused on the deliberate
bypass by the petitioner himself; a choice made by counsel without
consultation did not automatically bar relief.' Nevertheless, the
lower federal courts recognize the realities and pressures of trial;
they have generally focused on the actions of the defendant's
attorney, finding a deliberate bypass on his part if he could have
77. The Court gave an indication that "actual" prejudice was going to be required under
the "cause and prejudice" test by stating that other substantial evidence of guilt presented
at trial would bar a finding that the petitioner had been in any way prejudiced in the state
court by the alleged constitutional violation. 433 U.S. at 91. In addition, the previous cases
which established the "cause and prejudice" standard and which were relied upon in Sykes
made clear that a finding of actual prejudice was to be required. See Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1973).
78. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1971). The Court found that no
actual prejudice had been shown to have resulted to the defendant solely from the fact that
the government had delayed in prosecuting him for consumer fraud. The defendant did not
show any real detriment to his defense, and his reliance upon possibilities of prejudice that
accompany any such delay did not reach the level of actual prejudice.
79. In Francis, Justice Brennan stated that under the actual prejudice standard, the
petitioner would have to prove that he would not in fact have been indicted absent the
constitutional violations involved in the racial composition of the grand jury. 425 U.S. at 557
(Brennan, J., dissenting). For a view that petitioners should have to present a colorable claim
of innocence in order to collaterally challenge their convictions, see Friendly, supra note 51,
at 142.
80. Justice Brennan had reservations that a petitioner would ever be able to meet this
burden of proof. 425 U.S. at 557 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. 372 U.S. at 439.
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reasonably decided not to object at the trial level."2 Such a finding
binds the defendant to his attorney's act.83 It is unclear under Sykes
whether lawyer error will continue to bind the unconsulted defendant only if it reaches the level of a deliberate bypass by the attorney, or whether all attorney error will bind the defendant absent a
showing of "cause and prejudice." Should it be the latter, the result
will weigh heavily upon indigent defendants who are not assured of
acquiring competent counsel.
The present standard set by the Court will make federal habeas
available only in exceptional circumstances. This is in clear conflict
with congressional policy in favor of federal post-trial review of state
criminal convictions as enunciated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.11 In addition, responsibility for protecting vital constitutional rights will devolve upon the state courts which, it has been argued, have not
always been zealous in preserving federal constitutional rights.85
Even assuming the utmost integrity on the part of state courts, for
other reasons it may still be preferrable to have federal constitutional issues weighed by a federal habeas court. 8
The present Supreme Court has retreated from the expanded view
of availability of federal habeas corpus set forth in Fay to an extent
that, practically, it must be considered overruled. The adoption of
the "cause and prejudice" test restricts the remedial power of the
federal courts while it enhances the status of state courts as final
arbiters of federal constitutional claims. A determination of the
extent of deference to be afforded the state courts awaits the
promulgation of some much needed guidelines as to the bounds of
82. See 433 U.S. at 94 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
83. This approach was sanctioned in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-52 (1965),
where an attorney's deliberate bypass of an objection at trial, in contravention of the state's
contemporaneous objection rule, was held binding on the defendant under Fay.
84. 433 U.S. at 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also note 36 and accompanying text
supra.
85. See Alive or A Wake, supra note 72, at 347.
86. See Chisum, supra note 67, at 692 (the security of tenure afforded federal judges
guarantees a more impartial and, generally, better qualified judge). See also Note,
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038, 1060-61 (1970)
("The federal habeas court . . . is lodged in a different institutional setting, with different
loyalties and assumptions which may foster greater hospitality to constitutional goals. ...
[Tihe state judge's allegiance to the Constitution may be weakened by his proximity to the
state's enforcement of its criminal law.").
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the "cause and prejudice" standard. One thing, however, is certain:
the state courts have received a heavy burden of constitutional responsibility.
Gary J. Gushard

